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Chief, EE

Chief of Base, Frankfurt

Operational/CART

[ ] Initial Report

REFERENCE: EGFA 11197

1. In June 1956 [ ] who had returned from Soviet POW internment in February 1956, received from the U. S. Air Force a routine invitation to come to the 7056 Air Intelligence Service Squadron in Frankfurt and be debriefed on his experiences and observations while in the Soviet Union. Although he was scheduled to appear on 26 June, he arrived on the 20th, and at the outset of his interview volunteered the information that he had been captured by the Russians while serving with the Lithuanian partisans in 1947, was doubled against the partisans by the MGB, remained in an MGB-controlled "trusty" status until the beginning of 1955, and was then prepared, over a year's time, for an apparently long-range espionage mission in the West. He stated that since returning to his parents' home in the Saarland he had been unemployed, living from veteran rehabilitation subsidies, and that he had taken no steps whatever in the direction of carrying out his RIS mission. He further stated that he had never before discussed any aspect of the matter with any person, privately or officially. The Air Force determined that KUBARK had a primary interest in the matter, and turned over [ ] to FOB/CART on 21 June.

2. [ ] was born in Saarlouis (Saarlautern) on 1 June 1923, the son of Mathias - - - - and Anna nee Adams. He attended Volksschule and one year of business school in Saarlouis, held a small commercial position there as well as being engaged in several parental business ventures. In 1941 he was called into the German Labor Service, and after three months transferred directly to the Army, where he was trained as a Signal Corps telephonist and chauffeur. In the Fall of 1941 he was assigned to the signal battalion of the 56th Corps, and in 1942 was transferred to the 161st Infantry Division, where he remained until the end of the war. The 161st was attached to the Mittelabschnitt on the Russian front. He was taken prisoner in the rank of Obergepewer, in April 1945, when the entire unit capitulated to the Red Army at Heiligen Geil in East Prussia. Actually, [ ] was not picked up until a day or so after the surrender of his unit. He had attempted, with others, to make off by sea from the coast, but was picked up by a small Russian unit, put to work for several days, and then turned over to an M.B. detachment in Tapiau, East Prussia. He was held by the MGB unit for three weeks, during which time he was interrogated as to the reason why he had not surrendered with the rest of his division. Then he was moved to a prison in Allenstein, East Prussia. This jail was occupied primarily by German civilians who were suspected by the Russians of having

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DATE 2007

SECRET

ECFA 11390

Page Two

committed acts of sabotage against the Red Army. In the Fall of 1945 he was sent, with the other POW's, to the POW camp at Insterburg, which is approximately 30 miles from the Lithuanian border. In the Spring of 1946, when the prisoners were to be shipped to the Soviet Union, he escaped with a camp acquaintance named Arnold Schneider, and fled to Lithuania. Schneider, he has since heard, was later killed while fighting with the Lithuanian partisans.

3. [ ] reports that at the time of his escape from POW confinement he didn't know that a partisan organization existed in Lithuania. He managed to keep alive for approximately four months through the aid given by farmers, who helped him because they had been sympathetic to the German cause. He stayed for about fourteen days at a farm in the Marianopol area, during the Summer of 1946, and was there introduced to a member of the partisan forces, and thereupon joined them. The partisan forces were comprised almost entirely of Lithuanian nationals, but there were also some former German Wehrmacht members fighting with them. The Germans took part in the fighting activities of the groups, but did not participate in the planning sessions that preceded these actions, since they apparently did not enjoy the full confidence of the partisans. After some weeks with his partisan group, [ ] was sworn-in in the presence of the Lithuanian flag, given the cover name "Peter" and a weapon, and assigned to fighting duties. Activities of the partisans included raids on Russian transportation and money shipments, distribution of the patriotic newspaper "Taurus," and assassinations of persons who collaborated with the Russians.

4. One day in April 1947, [ ] did a bit of celebrating with a partisan friend known to him only as "Josef." They tarried through the night at the home of two girls, and were then afraid to attempt to get back to the woods in the daylight. They sought refuge at the home of friends in the neighborhood, but the commotion resulting from their efforts to gain entry to the house attracted the attention of the nearby Russians, and they were captured. Their intended rescuers were also taken into custody.

5. He was first confined in the jail in Marianopol for about four weeks. Here he was interrogated at length by the MGB, and admittedly did a good bit of talking in order to save his own skin. No harsh treatment was given, presumably because it wasn't necessary. He was then transferred to Jail #1 in Vilnius. There, formal arrest papers and other documents were prepared, and [ ] awaited word of his sentence, which most certainly would be 25 years in a prison camp, or death. After about three months' confinement in Jail #1, three men came to his cell. Two of them were civilians, the other wore the uniform of an MGB major. (The major will hereafter be referred to as "E".) The men were friendly and full of understanding for his position, stating that they appreciated that he was not fighting with the partisans as a

SECRET

SECRET

EGFA 11390  
Page Three

matter of choice, but simply because they had offered him a haven after he escaped from POW confinement. He was invited to assist the MGB in its efforts to wipe out the partisans, and accepted. He did not find the decision a difficult one to reach, with Siberia the alternative. It was desired of him that he accompany two other men, also doubled partisans, in delivering a letter to a specified partisan group, at its place of hiding, creating the impression that the letter was coming from another active partisan unit. [ ] protested that he would certainly be shot on sight in any attempt to approach an unknown partisan stronghold but was assured that the other men would be accepted by the partisans, and that there was no danger. He then accepted, believing that the expedition might offer an opportunity for escape. About a week after agreeing to participate in this mission, he was taken from Jail #1, and placed in a single room in the cellar of the MGB Headquarters located in the Stalinallee (then the Gedemino St.) near Lenin Square in Vilnyus. The food was good, and the general treatment was that accorded a "trusty" rather than a prisoner. On the day set for the mission he was brought together with the other two men, who, like himself, had been garbed in partisan-type clothing, and given a weapon. They were taken by several soldiers and driven in an automobile to a point in the country, where the three got out and proceeded to a point in the woods where contact was made with a partisan member. This person was simply handed a letter and the three departed. [ ] assumes that the letter contained instructions to the partisan group to proceed to a set rendezvous with another unit, where they would be ambused by the MGB. He did not make any attempt to escape, since he gained the impression that the other two were loyal to the Russians, and would shoot him if he made a false move. Upon his return to Vilnyus he was complimented by the Russians on his good performance and told that after a few minor details had been settled he would be permitted to return to Germany. In the meantime he would continue to occupy the cellar room. Actually it was another eight and one-half years before he saw his home again.

6. At the end of the summer of 1947 he was taken to an MGB safehouse, a villa situated in the Pavilnis suburb of Vilnyus. The place was surrounded by a high fence and there was always a guard at the entrance. It was understood that this was not to be a permanent change of residence, but rather a temporary opportunity to relax and have a change of scenery before being sent out on a special assignment. The other residents of the villa were former partisans and Lithuanian auxiliary police. The atmosphere was pleasant, and the men conversed freely among themselves, but shop talk was completely excluded. From the villa [ ] was dispatched with a group to take part in a deception exercise of a type which, with certain variations, was to be repeated frequently in the years that followed. In this instance the purpose was to stage, with MGB personnel disguised as partisans, an ambush on overt MGB guards who were escorting a prisoner from one point to another. As well as [ ] understood the tactic, the purpose was to

SECRET

SECRET

ECFA 11390  
Page Four

convince the captive that he had really been liberated from his guards by the partisans, and thus extract voluntarily from him a confession of his true status and position, which the MGB has been unable to gain through normal interrogation methods. To support the ruse, the MGB had constructed a convincing, partisan-type hideout in the woods, and to this place the "liberated" captive was taken following the ambush. Here he was ready to talk freely about matters that he had been concealing during his interrogations, and only after he had finished his song did he realize that his audience was Russian-controlled. [ ] services were useful in that by speaking a few words of German during the proceedings he added credibility to the partisan masquerade. We have not yet questioned [ ] in detail on what form his other missions of this general category assumed, but it is understood that the purpose in all cases was some form of deception, provocation, or ambush.

7. According to [ ] interrogation testimony, nothing of note occurred in his own life or in his MGB status until the summer of 1952. He continued to reside most of the time in the cellar room. At that time he was visited by an MGB Major ("A") who said that he was from Moscow. "A" talked at considerable length on the political situation in West Germany, and particularly deplored the way the Germans were being exploited by the Americans. The United States was preparing the Germans to fight its European battles for it, and to the Americans the Germans were nothing more than cannon fodder. Would [ ] be willing to assist the Soviet Union in its fight for peace? [ ] said that he was ready and was assured that the matter would be discussed further in the near future. About ten days later he was taken to one of the upstairs offices in the Headquarters' building, where "A", two other Russians in mufti (one of these is described as "B" in paragraph 20), and a Lithuanian born German were present. It was the wish of the MGB that [ ] and the other German accompany each other on a mission to the Federal Republic. The nature of the mission was not revealed. The Lithuanian, however, protested that he was quite unqualified for such an undertaking, since he had hardly ever been in any part of the old Reich, was completely unfamiliar with West Germany and its people, and had no plausible reason for going there. This terminated the discussion, and, as it developed, the plan, because it was never mentioned again. Both men were cautioned never to mention the matter to anyone. At a later date [ ] heard at the Pavilnis villa that the Lithuanian German had not been able to keep his mouth shut.

8. Finally, in January-February 1955 [ ] was introduced to a Captain DUBROWIN, who was to be his case officer and prepare him for his dispatch to the West in January 1956. He was assigned the pseudonym BALANDIS which is the Lithuanian word for "dove." The first step was to establish him as a regular resident of the Villa. He was advised that his status had changed to that of a "Freier" (this is the German term used by him), and he

SECRET

was henceforth permitted to move about as he wished, being provided with spending money for entertainment purposes. He could visit Vilnius as often as he pleased, and, except for certain obligations indicated below, could spend his time any way he wished. He was, however, required to return to the villa each night to sleep. In reality, the complete freedom of movement that he enjoyed, at least between the villa and the city of Vilnius, provided cover for his frequent meetings with DUBROWIN, which commenced at this time. He would, on certain days, go to the city for the apparent purpose of amusing himself, and then report to DUBROWIN in the MGB building for instruction. DUBROWIN shared Room #21 on the third floor (U.S.) with a first lieutenant.

9. The main training effort conducted directly by DUBROWIN concerned the building of a legend consonant with his intended return to Germany in a POW transport. No element in his true biography was altered up to that point in 1947 when, while fighting with the partisans, he was taken prisoner. But at that point on, according to the legend, he had been tried, and sentenced to 25 years confinement in a prison camp. In order that at a later date he would be able to convincingly describe his trial, it was arranged that he attend actual court proceedings of a nature similar to what he would have been exposed to had things gone differently with him. And further, he was taken by DUBROWIN to the prison camp UC 62/4-2, situated east of Gerki, and there spent fifteen days studying all aspects of the camp life and structure, so that he would be able to give a convincing account of the eight years that he supposedly spent there. He believes that the RIS took the added precaution of having him confined, according to the legend, in a camp where no other German POW's were held, thus reducing the possibility of his story being blown through a chance meeting with a bona fide inmate of the camp.

10. S/W training was given by a woman whose name is not known to [redacted]. About fifteen training sessions were held. On each occasion, DUBROWIN would rent a room in one of the major hotels in Vilnius and give the key to [redacted] who would go there in the evening and await the arrival of the instructress. She would bring with her all materials necessary for the instruction, conduct the business in a highly professional and impersonal manner, and then depart. He had the choice of occupying the room for the rest of the night or returning to his own quarters.

11. Instruction was given in both writing and developing S/W messages, although, as indicated later, the plan to have [redacted] receive correspondence in this form was scrapped just before his departure for West Germany. The actual methods taught will be described later in this dispatch. Similarly, the communications instructions given to him, both the provisional and the final, will be taken up separately.

12. After spending about two months at the villa, [ ] was "discharged" from the service of the MGB, and he therewith terminated his residence in the villa. He was one of several persons who were overtly released from service. He does not know if this amounted to a real separation in the other cases, but his own relationship with the RIS continued uninterrupted on a covert basis. He moved first to a room in the Hotel Vilnius, and then to a single room arranged for him by DUBROWIN at No. 4 Tartaren Street in Vilnius. The room, evidently permanently held by the RIS, had a separate entrance from the street. The people residing in the remainder of the house were apparently not connected with the RIS.

13. His contacts with DUBROWIN continued on an almost daily basis, either with [ ] going to DUBROWIN's office, or being visited in his room by DUBROWIN. DUBROWIN could be reached on the telephone at 88-612 or 613. He was given spending money on a regular basis, but in each case only enough to carry him for two or three days. While still living at the villa he had been given a Sorki (Leica type) camera, and some books on photography. He was enjoined to keep these possessions a secret from the other villa residents. After moving into Vilnius, he was given a permit to carry a camera and to take pictures of public structures, and was thus provided with something of an employment cover. He was also supplied with a developing kit so that he could develop pictures in his room. Mainly, as stated, DUBROWIN drilled him on his legend during this period, and, as [ ] describes it, endeavored to equip him with the proper state of mind for the mission ahead. He was told that on the outside the danger of being surveilled always existed, and he was given theoretical instruction in how to frustrate such efforts. Particularly, he was given advice on how best to drop a letter into a mailbox when he knew or felt that he was under observation. In November 1955, [ ] made the above-mentioned visit to the penal institution in the company of DUBROWIN, travelling by plane as far as Moscow, and proceeding from there by train to the camp site, about 300 km east of Gorki. He lived there as an official visitor, and was able to see parts of the camp pertinent to his legend. He was not required to live the life of a real internee. After fifteen days in the camp the two men returned to Moscow, where they remained three or four days, staying at the Hotel Europa. [ ] had a single room, and had no feeling of being under guard. Several officials in civilian clothes came to see him at the hotel, and both the prison camp orientation and the future mission to Germany were discussed in general terms. He was told that he would be presented with final written instructions when he returned to Vilnius.

14. He had given up his room in the Tartaren St. prior to leaving for the prison camp, and when he got back, around the middle of December 1955, he put up at a hotel until his final departure for Moscow in the first week of January. In Vilnius DUBROWIN issued him the sort of clothing that a Soviet prisoner would wear, and he was instructed to pack these with his belongings

SECRET

EGFA 11390

Page Seven

when he departed for Moscow. But he was not given further instructions on his mission or communications. On about 6 January [ ] and DUBROWIN left by train for Moscow and stayed originally at the Hotel Leningrad, and then at a hotel on the Mayakovski Square, (the name could not be recalled). Here he was again visited by the two men in civilian clothes, accompanied by another man ("C" in paragraph 20) who was clearly the superior and took charge of the meeting. The latter rejected the plan that had been set up for [ ] receipt of messages, and shortened considerably the prepared statement of the mission, which was then signed by [ ]. [ ] also signed, as an indication of having understood, a statement outlining his legend, and one covering the final communications arrangements.

15. On 10 January he was taken by automobile to a point about one km distant from the entrance to transient Camp #14, which is situated near the Bykovo (phonetic) suburb of Moscow. Guards from the camp came to the automobile and escorted him to the camp, where he was registered in as a regular prisoner. On the same afternoon, however, he was taken out of the camp, on the pretext that he was being taken directly to a transport, and driven back to Moscow. He spent that evening in a hotel, and on 11 January, dressed in appropriate clothing, he was taken to a Moscow freight station and placed on a train of returnees that was passing through the city on its way to the West. On 16 January he entered the Federal Republic at Herlingshausen, was processed at the Friedland camp and proceeded to his parent's home in the Saar.

16. S/W TRAINING: [ ] was trained in both preparing and developing S/W messages, although the plan for him to receive messages in this form was cancelled just before his departure for the West. The carbon method was selected for the transmission of messages by him, and he was apparently given enough practice in this to make certain that his product would be satisfactory. Following familiar techniques, he would first write an open text message on a piece of fairly good quality writing paper, making the message sufficiently long that it covered at least three pages. The first and third sides (not sheets) were the ones that would contain the S/W. The first (and subsequently third) page of the open letter was then placed on a piece of glass or other very hard surface in such a position that the S/W message would be written at right angles to and over the open text (not on the clear side of the sheet). An S/W carbon was placed on top of this sheet, and on top of that was placed another sheet of letter paper of the same size as the first sheet. The S/W message was then written in block letters on this top sheet. A fairly strong pencil pressure should be maintained. No letters should be written closer than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  cm from any edge (to permit handling without smearing) or closer than 1 cm to any fold. The sheet containing the S/W was finally passed over a

SECRET

SECRET

EGPA 11390

Page Eight

vessel of steaming water to reduce any impressions that had been made in it despite the hard backing that had been used. He was instructed to number the S/W messages consecutively in the upper right corner of the secret text. The message was to be closed with the date and the word "and," or its equivalent in the language used in the rest of the text. It was further required that all proper nouns, such as names of persons and addresses, be printed out twice (John John Brown Brown) and that digits be similarly repeated. In order to impress [ ] with the success of the method, and at the same time to point out to him where improvement was needed, he was shown negative photo plates of the developed messages. On these it could be pointed out where he had pressed too much or too little with the pencil, where he had come too close to the margin, etc. Since he never got a look at the original developed message, he has no idea what color the secret letters assumed. In November or December 1955, he was given the actual carbons that he was to take with him on his mission, and was given the opportunity to make several tests with these, in order to convince him of their effectiveness. These carbons were not separate sheets, but two impregnated pages (pp 59-60; 159-160) in a German language mathematics book (Mathematik fuer Metallarbeitende Berufe, Part I, by E. Casse; Fachbuchverlag Leipzig). The outside of the back cover is defaced and carries a bluish ink spot. As a result of efforts to remove a stamp showing that the book was sold in the Soviet Union the surface of the cover was torn, and the ink was employed to hide the fact that there had once been a label on that spot. [ ] was told that each of these carbons could be used to print up to thirty messages. Efforts by MKTOPAZ to develop messages printed with these carbons have so far been unsuccessful. The use of the book to serve another purpose will be mentioned under communications.

17. [ ] was also trained in a method for developing S/W messages received by him. He was to burn newspapers, place the ashes in a vessel and add just enough water to form a paste. Thereafter more water was to be added, the mixture brought to a boil, and strips of the S/W sheets immersed in it until the message appeared. It was at the meeting described in paragraph 14 above that this method of transmitting communications was rejected in favor of receiving bits of microfilm (not microdots) concealed in postcards. While this meeting was in progress an expert was hastily summoned to demonstrate to [ ] how he should soak the lower left-hand corner of the postcard (picture side up) in water, then take a pointed matchstick and carefully dig out the piece of film that was concealed there. A 25-power magnifying glass would have sufficient strength for reading the message. A microscope would, of course, be more satisfactory, but the possession of such an article by [ ] was not considered advisable unless he had a very good cover reason.

18. Communications: In the months' prior to his dispatch on a mission, [ ] had been briefed in a variety of communication means, a number of which were abandoned at the last minute. Some of these

SECRET

SECRET

EGFA 11390

Page Nine

instructions, which follow, were contained in a prepared memorandum, which he signed as having understood on the occasion of his last sojourn in Moscow. Others, such as that bearing on his receipt of microfilm, were given orally at that same meeting. He was told that after a period of about six months, i.e., late July 1956, he was to send off a secret writing message to first one, and then, if there were no reply, to a second address in Lithuania.

(These addresses will be forwarded in a separate dispatch). This letter was to be sent through regular mail channels, and to indicate as sender a Lithuanian name, and, if possible, an address where Lithuanians are known to reside. Obviously the letter was to be mailed in the city where the sender was shown to be living. Further, the open text of the letter was to contain some explanation of why the sender happened to be writing to that address. For example, it should be stated that the writer had just received the name of the addressee, and hoped that he might be of some aid in locating a lost brother. DUBROWIN appeared to be quite concerned about the possibility of getting caught up in German censorship of mail going to the East. As a point for receiving communications, [ ] was to establish an accommodation address during the six-month period of inactivity, and to advise the RIS of this address in his first S/W communication to them. At this address he would receive either an open picture postcard (containing the piece of microfilm) or a postcard inside an envelope. In either case it would be mailed in West Germany. Emergency instructions followed: Should he lose the book containing the carbons, and, therefore, be unable to communicate by means of S/W, he was to go to Berlin, and there call the East Berlin telephone number 502142 (see FRAN 0385), where a "Victor" would answer. [ ] was to tell Victor that he is a relative from Marianopol, whereupon Victor would reply that he would send his wife to meet him, and request a meeting place. Victor would then appear himself, with a photograph of [ ] for recognition, and approach him with the question, "Excuse me, do you know a Mr. DUBROWIN? (In German)."

19. [ ] was also told that once an accommodation address had been established he would be sent addresses in France and Switzerland to which he could flee should he find himself in danger. Should these not have been received and he should find it necessary to escape, he should go directly to the Soviet embassy in Switzerland, and ask for political asylum in the Soviet Union. He was also given to understand that should he fail to make letter contact with the RIS after a half a year, he would either receive a letter at his parents' address, or be approached in person.

20. MISSION: Before leaving Vilnius for Moscow in January 1955, [ ] was presented with a document which set forth his initial mission. It was intended that he would sign this document before final departure from Moscow. The main points contained therein were these:

- a. Return home, look up parents, and set personal affairs in order.
- b. Assume a normal manner of living.
- c. When assured that he had been accepted by his society as a

SECRET

normal returnee, start visiting public places and listen to conversations to determine the present political temper.

d. Attempt to learn of any installations where secret training is being conducted.

e. Observe any constructions projects, such as airfields, with a bearing on defense or war-making.

f. Note any armament factories or atomic power plants.

g. Undertake spotting of scientifically knowledgeable people who might be approached for information.

The statement ended with the word "understood," and a place for [ ] signature. At the final conference in Moscow, however, "C" discarded this prepared statement in favor of less detailed verbal instructions. According to these [ ] should remain almost completely inactive during the first six months, and do nothing that would attract suspicion to him. He should, however, establish three D/D's and one accommodation address, and make these known to the RIS in his first communication to them. He should consider the possibility of establishing a safe apartment for putting up short term guests, but should take no active steps in accomplishing this.

## 20. DESCRIPTIONS

### a. DUBROWIN, (fnu)

Apparent age 30-33

Always wore civilian clothes, but often referred to as "Captain."

Approximately 174 cm tall

Strong build

Oval face, light complexion

Thick lips.

Light blond hair

Sometimes wore plain or sun glasses on street

Normal dresser

Married, with wife and children living in Vilnius, address unknown.

Had a calm, friendly manner.

Evidently Russian, with documents made out in the name of DUBROWIN.

DUBROWIN's office was room 21 in the MGB Headquarters' building

(3rd floor, American). He shared this office with another

official, believed to be a 1st Lieutenant. There was no

secretary in the room.

SECRET

EGFA 11390  
Page Eleven

- b. Across the hall from Room 21 was the office of DUBROWIN's chief who is described as:  
165 cm tall  
Corpulent  
Apparent age 50  
Totally bald  
Rank of Colonel  
This man had to sign approvals for money given to [C] ].
- c. Major "A"  
Known as Major RYBIKH, believed now to be Lt. Colonel.  
Short, well proportioned figure  
Apparent age 45-50 years  
Almost completely bald  
Witty personality  
Family resided in Moscow, he spent part of his time from 1952-55 in Vilnyus.  
Never seen in uniform  
Apparently had some supervisory control over DUBROWIN's work.
- d. "B"  
Lt. Colonel, name unknown  
Apparent age 50-55  
Medium height  
Corpulent  
Graying hair  
Nervous, heavy smoker, chewed cigarettes  
Occasionally in uniform  
"B" was present in the Vilnyus office when [C] ] was presented with the plan of being sent to West Germany. He also appeared in Moscow at the meetings following [C] ] return from the prison camp.
- e. "C"  
175 cm tall  
Apparent age 40 years  
Dark eyes and hair  
Large mouth, large even teeth  
Dark skin  
Broad shoulders  
Had the manner of a fairly important official. The others acted restrained in his presence.
- f. "D" (female)  
Apparent age 37-38 years  
Medium height and build  
Not attractive  
Medium blond hair, drawn straight back and worn in a roll.  
Always wore a light blue coat.

SECRET

SECRET

EGFA 11390  
Page Twelve

- g. Major "E"  
175 cm tall  
Lean build  
Apparent age 45 years  
Always seen in uniform, in which he made a sloppy appearance.  
Hooked nose  
Fond of hunting, frequently seen carrying a hunting rifle.  
A native of Siberia, poorly educated.  
AECHAMP-21 saw "E" at the Villa on numerous occasions. "E"  
took part in a number of the staged actions against the  
partisans.

21. Circumstances have so far made it impossible for us to fully debrief or assess [ ], or to establish his bona fides. If we are to believe him, he wavered over a period of months between reporting his recruitment to some competent authority or doing nothing whatever about the matter, and, if others would permit him to do so, forgetting about it. Had the invitation from the Air Force not come, it is doubtful that he would have decided to tell his story, although he says that some time or other he would have gotten around to it. At the time this invitation came, he had been hanging around home since late January, living from veteran benefits, and apparently concerning himself very little about his future. He did, however, become engaged to marry, and plans to wed around the middle of August. In the Saarland, the government has assumed considerable responsibility in rehabilitating returnees, both in supporting them through veteran benefits for a six months period, and thereafter giving them preferential consideration for positions in the civil service. The most likely destination for most of the returnees is the police, since there are no such specific requirements of skill and experience as would be the case with the Finanzamt or the railway. [ ] has already made application for a position with the police, and expects to be called for interview and examinations in the month of July. Since he is free from any serious physical disability, and in view of his veteran status, it seems likely that he will be accepted.

22. The circumstances which have, and probably will continue to make handling of the man difficult, are these:

a. On his initial visit to Frankfurt, two days were lost before the case was assumed by FOB/CART, and while interrogations were then undertaken on a daily basis, it was not considered wise to extend his absence from home beyond seven days, since a normal Air Force debriefing could not be expected to last more than two or three days.

b. Even during this period it was not possible to interrogate him for the length of time desired, since he was being handled as a voluntary source rather than an apprehended spy, and made clear his wish to have the evenings and Sunday to himself. During these sessions he was presented with

SECRET

SECRET

EGPA 11390  
Page Thirteen

the idea of extending his voluntary cooperation at least to the point of establishing contact with the RIS through the communications system given him, and providing us with an opportunity to monitor whatever their next move would be. He agreed to this, insisting, however, on assurances that we would protect him in the event that the Russians should discover that he had been doubled and attempt to harm him. He also wished to be assured that his participating in such a game would not at some future date cause him difficulties with the Saar or German authorities.

c. Continued handling will be complicated by the fact that the Saar is a considerable distance from Frankfurt, and, until the beginning of 1957, will continue to be a foreign country. So as [ ] is unemployed and living with his parents, he has no plausible reason or means for frequent and lengthy absences from home. His imminent marriage will in no way diminish this problem. If he gets a position with the police, his movements will be further circumscribed. On the other hand, a case officer equipped with nothing more satisfactory than a true name Special Passport is reluctant to expose himself at regular intervals to the Saar border control. Since he left Frankfurt, [ ] has been met twice in the city of Kaiserslautern, the nearest point to the Saar that offers adequate operational security. In order that a two and one-half hour meeting be possible, he had to be absent from his home for about ten hours - hours which had to be accounted for at least to a fiancée.

d. We cannot see any possibility in the near future of establishing [ ] bona fides. There appears at this time to be no opportunity for persuading him to submit to extended interrogations or to an LCFLUTTER examination. And even were he willing to undergo this, the means of accomplishing it without involving him in frequent and inexplicable absences from home are not evident.

e. The only reason we can find for [ ] willingness to work with us at all is the relatively small amount of money that we have been paying out to him for his troubles. He avows no enthusiasm for the Western cause or the Americans, and no animosity toward the Russians. He told his story to the Americans because they were the group that the RIS had specifically mentioned as a subsequent target. He is willing to cooperate at least to the extent of sending off an S/W message to the RIS announcing that he is safe and settled, thus implying that he is ready for further instructions. At the same time, he does not intend to report his former and continuing RIS affiliation to the police at the time of his interview or thereafter. If, however, he is later called upon by the RIS to perform a mission against the interests of the Saar or West German government, he will feel obliged to report this to his superiors, and in this connection has asked for our assurances that the U. S. Government will at that time be ready to advise higher German authorities officially that any acts he has undertaken in carrying out his RIS mission were performed in good faith under U. S. direction.

SECRET

f. Because he volunteered his confession to a U. S. agency, and because there is no apparent motivation in his readiness to cooperate, we are confronted with suspicions regarding his true purposes. On the other hand, his volunteering the sort of information contained in ECFA 11392, and his reporting as an emergency contact an East Berlin telephone number already known from another source to be RIS, and his turning over to us the alleged carbon sheets, argue in favor of accepting him as honest. This is where we presently stand.

23. Under supervision, [ ] will dispatch an initial S/W message to the RIS, disclosing only his present address and situation, and supplying an accommodation address for future contact.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

3 - EE  
2 - COS  
2 - SR

18 July 1956

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